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Learning to Play Nash from the Best

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Author Info
Robert S. Gazzale (Williams College)

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Abstract

I experimentally investigate the effects of the ability to imitate successful others on convergence to the one-shot Nash equilibrium. I study a two-player game (Potters and Suetens Forthcoming) in which a single parameter determines the existence of strategic complementarities. I generally confirm previous findings when learning from others is not possible: games with strategic complementarities converge more robustly to the Nash equilibrium than those without. However, I find the reverse with the ability to learn from successful others as this information significantly improves convergence in games without strategic complementarities but has no effect and possibly a negative effect on games with complementarities.

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File URL: http://www.williams.edu/Economics/wp/gazzaleImitationExperimentBest%20%283%29.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Williams College in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2009-03.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
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Handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2009-03

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-17.

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