Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
AbstractPrice dynamics are characterized when a price-fixing cartel is concerned about creating suspicions of the presence of a cartel A dynamical extension of static models yields the counterfactual prediction that the cartel initially raises price and then gradually lowers it An alternative specification generates a more plausible result that the cartel gradually raises price For that specification the long-run cartel price is found to be decreasing in the damage multiple but is independent of the level of fixed fines A more stringent standard for calculating damages is shown to induce the cartel to price higher
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Paper Archive with number 460.
Date of creation: May 2001
Date of revision: Jul 2002
Other versions of this item:
- Joseph E. Harrington, 2005. "Optimal Cartel Pricing In The Presence Of An Antitrust Authority," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(1), pages 145-169, 02.
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