The Anticompetitive Effects of the Antitrust Policy
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences in its series Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers with number 18.
Date of creation: Feb 2009
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-02-28 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2009-02-28 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers
19, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
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487, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised May 2003.
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