Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence

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Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence

Author Info

Robert W. Crandall
Clifford Winston

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Clifford M. Winston

Abstract

This paper reviews the literature and assesses the effects of antitrust policy and enforcement on consumer welfare. We find no evidence that antitrust policy in the areas of monopolization, collusion, and mergers has provided much benefit to consumers and, in some instances, we find evidence that it may have lowered consumer welfare. We also do not find any evidence that antitrust policy has deterred firms from engaging in actions that could harm consumers. We identify various reasons for the apparent ineffectiveness of antitrust policy, offer preliminary policy recommendations, and suggest ways in which economists could more fully assess antitrust policy.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 17 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Pages: 3-26
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:17:y:2003:i:4:p:3-26

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Ghosal, Vivek, 2006. "Discovering Cartels: Dynamic Interrelationships between Civil and Criminal Antitrust Investigations," MPRA Paper 5499, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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