Railroads and Competition: The Santa Fe/Southern Pacific Merger Proposal
AbstractThe "Merger Guidelines" of the U.S. Department of Justice provide the framework for a detailed analysis of the competitive implications of the proposed merger of the Santa Fe and Southern Pacific railroads. Although the gross welfare loss from the merger is found to be large--in the range of $40-230 million per year--the transfers from shippers to the railroads are much larger. Thus, an overall welfare calculus requires not only an accurate estimate of the efficiencies resulting from the merger, but also a judgment as to the welfare relevance of wealth transfers. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 39 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pittman, Russell, 2011. "Risk-averse restructuring of freight railways in China," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 152-160.
- John Bitzan & Wesley Wilson, 2007. "Industry costs and consolidation: efficiency gains and mergers in the U.S. railroad industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 81-105, March.
- Crandall, Robert W. & Winston, Clifford, 2004.
"Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence,"
- Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, 2003. "Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 3-26, Fall.
- Russell Pittman, 2002. "Chinese Railway Reform and Competition: Vertical or Horizontal Restructuring?," Development and Comp Systems 0204004, EconWPA.
- Russell Pittman, 2003. "Vertical Restructuring (or Not) of the Infrastructure Sectors of Transition Economies," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 5-26, March.
- Affuso, Luisa & Newbery, David M G, 2000. "Investment, Reprocurement and Franchise Contract Length in the British Railway Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 2619, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Mccullough, Gerard, 2010.
"Welfare Tradeoffs in U.S. Rail Mergers,"
TSE Working Papers
10-196, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Russell Pittman, 2009. "Competition Issues in Restructuring Ports and Railways, Including Brief Consideration of these Sectors in India," EAG Discussions Papers 200906, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
- Schmidt, Stephen, 2001. "Market structure and market outcomes in deregulated rail freight markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 99-131, January.
- Russ Pittman, 2007.
"Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement,"
Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
- Russell Pittman, 2007. "Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement," EAG Discussions Papers 200709, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
- Russell Pittman, 2001. "Vertical Restructuring of the Infrastructure Sectors of Transition Economies," Industrial Organization 0111002, EconWPA.
- R. Pittman, 2009.
"Railway Mergers and Railway Alliances: Competition Issues and Lessons for Other Network Industries,"
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries,
Intersentia, vol. 10(3), pages 259-279, September.
- Russell Pittman, 2009. "Railway Mergers and Railway Alliances: Competition Issues and Lessons for Other Network Industries," EAG Discussions Papers 200902, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.