Antitrust and Higher Education: Was There a Conspiracy to Restrict Financial Aid?
AbstractIn 1991, the U.S. Justice Department's Antitrust Division accused MIT and the Ivy League schools of fixing prices. The schools claimed that their cooperative behavior enabled them to concentrate financial aid on needy students and did not affect price. We analyze the empirical determinants of tuition and find no evidence that the schools' agreement raised price. We also analyze the appropriate application of the antitrust laws to nonprofit institutions and conclude that, in the absence of adverse price or output effects, the justification for the collective action should be considered under the "Rule of Reason."
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 26 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
Other versions of this item:
- Dennis W. Carlton & Gustavo E. Bamberger & Roy J. Epstein, 1995. "Antitrust and Higher Education: Was There a Conspiracy to Restrict Financial Aid?," NBER Working Papers 4998, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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