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Antitrust and Higher Education: Was There a Conspiracy to Restrict Financial Aid?

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  • Dennis W. Carlton
  • Gustavo E. Bamberger
  • Roy J. Epstein

Abstract

In 1991, the U.S. Justice Department's Antitrust Division accused MIT and the Ivy League schools of fixing prices. The schools claimed that their cooperative behavior enabled them to concentrate financial aid on needy students and did not affect price. We analyze the empirical determinants of tuition and find no evidence that the schools' agreement raised price. We also analyze the appropriate application of the antitrust laws to nonprofit institutions and conclude that, in the absence of adverse price or output effects, the justification for the collective action should be considered under the "Rule of Reason."

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 26 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 131-147

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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:spring:p:131-147

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References

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  1. J. A. Hausman, 1976. "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Working papers 185, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Dennis W. Carlton & Gustavo E. Bamberger & Roy J. Epstein, 1994. "Antitrust and Higher Education," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 107, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  3. Michael Rothschild & Lawrence J. White, 1991. "The University in the Marketplace: Some Insights and Some Puzzles," NBER Working Papers 3853, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Tjalling C. Koopmans & Martin J. Beckmann, 1955. "Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 4, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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Cited by:
  1. Gordon C. Winston, 1999. "Subsidies, Hierarchy and Peers: The Awkward Economics of Higher Education," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 13-36, Winter.
  2. Crandall, Robert W. & Winston, Clifford, 2004. "Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence," Working paper 263, Regulation2point0.
  3. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard & Sieg, Holger, 2000. "Peer Effects, Financial Aid, and Selection of Students into Colleges and Universities: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 00-02, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  4. Becker, William E. & Round, David K., 2009. "'The' Market for Higher Education: Does It Really Exist?," IZA Discussion Papers 4092, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Alexis Walckiers, 2008. "Multi-dimensional contracts with task-specific productivity: an application to universities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 165-198, April.

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