Hierarchical Assignments: Stability and Fairness

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Hierarchical Assignments: Stability and Fairness

Author Info

Eriksson, Kimmo (Department of Mathematics)
Karlander, Johan (Department of Mathematics)
Öller, Lars-Erik () (Dept. of Economic Statistics, Stockholm School of Economics)

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Abstract

We study a simple model of the job market, where workers are assigned to employers. We specify conditions under which the market is hierarchical in a natural sense. For such hierarchies, we can state explicit values for the earnings in the worker-optimal and employer-optimal solutions. This is a discrete analogue to the Ricardian differential rent model of Sattinger (1979). We discuss the compatibility problems between fairness and stability of earnings and assignments and argue for a certain solution.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 201.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 27 Oct 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2000, pages 109-118.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0201

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Paper
- Eriksson, Kimmo & Karlander, Johan & Öller, Lars-Erik, 1996. "Hierarchical Assignments: Stability and Fairness," Working Paper 50, National Institute of Economic Research.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Kremer, Michael, 1993. "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 551-75, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
H. R. Varian, 1973. "Equity, Envy and Efficiency," Working papers 115, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Other versions:
- Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tjalling C. Koopmans & Martin J. Beckmann, 1955. "Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 4, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Sattinger, Michael, 1979. "Differential Rents and the Distribution of Earnings," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 60-71, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bloch, Francis & Ryder, Harl, 2000. "Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 93-115, February.
Lindbeck, A. & Snower, D.J., 1996. "Reorganization of Firms and Labor Market Inequality," Papers 605, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
Other versions:
- Lindbeck, A. & Snower, D.J., 1995. "Reorganization of Firms and Labor Market Inequality," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 448, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1996. "Reorganization of Firms and Labour Market Inequality," CEPR Discussion Papers 1375, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1997. "Reorganization of Firms and Labor Market Inequality," Seminar Papers 605, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1996. "Reorganization of Firms and Labor-Market Inequality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 315-21, May.
Burdett, Ken & Coles, Melvyn G, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 141-68, February.
Sattinger, Michael, 1993. "Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(2), pages 831-80, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Feldman, Allan M & Kirman, Alan, 1974. "Fairness and Envy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 995-1005, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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