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Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines

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Souam, Said

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 19 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (January)
Pages: 1-26
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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:19:y:2001:i:1-2:p:1-26

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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  1. Caroline Elliott & Melinda Acutt, 2007. "Antitrust Policy: The Impact of Revenue Penalties on Price," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-8, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Fiammetta Gordon & David Squires, 2008. "The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 411-432, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Joe Chen, 2005. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-359, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Thierry Penard & Saïd Souam, 2002. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 66, pages 09, Avril-Jui. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Caroline Elliott & Melinda Acutt, 2001. "Threat-based regulation and endogenously determined punishments," Working Papers 000040, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  6. Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J., 2004. "Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement," CeNDEF Working Papers 04-07, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Gianmaria MARTINI & Cinzia ROVESTI, 2004. "Antitrust policy and price collusion : public agencies vs delegation," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Jorge Tarziján M & Jose Hevia, 2005. "Jurisprudencia Sobre Precios Predatorios En Chile: ¿Han Sido Uniformes Los Criterios Aplicados," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 8(2), pages 59-85. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gianmaria Martini, 2005. "Hard Core Cartels and Avoidance of Investigation in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Industrial Organization 0502014, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Caroline Elliott & Melinda Acutt, 2007. "Antitrust Policy: The Impact of Revenue Penalties on Price," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-8, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Joseph E Harrington, 2001. "Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive 460, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Bergès-Sennou, F. & Loss, F. & Malavoti, E. & Vergé, T., 2001. "Competition policy and agreements between firms," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 22, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]
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