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Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Souam, Said
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization .
Volume (Year): 19 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (January)
Pages: 1-26
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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:19:y:2001:i:1-2:p:1-26Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
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