Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 24 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
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