What Can We Learn From The Adm Global Price Conspiracies?
AbstractADM was at the center of two large global price-fixig conspiracies. Buyers were overcharged $116 to $378 million in the United States. Market structure and corporate management style facilitated these cartels. The criminal prosecutions and defendants' legal strategies were both laudatory, but civil plaintiffs were short-changed. ADM has undergone severe management restructuring, but the effectiveness of apprehending global cartels with national legal enforcement is questionable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics in its series Working Papers with number 98-14.
Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Price fixing; global cartel; antitrust; citric acid; market structure; structural change; lysine; international trade; Archer Daniels Midland Co.; welfare analysis;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- John M. Connor, 1998. "The global citric acid conspiracy: Legal-economic lessons," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(6), pages 435-452.
- John Connor, 2001. "“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 5-21, February.
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