The global citric acid conspiracy: Legal-economic lessons
AbstractADM was at the center of two large global price-fixing conspiracies. Buyers were overcharged $116 to $378 million in the United States. Market structure and corporate management style facilitated these cartels. The criminal prosecutions and defendants' legal strategies were both laudatory, but civil plaintiffs were short-changed. ADM has undergone severe management restructuring, but the effectiveness of apprehending global cartels with national legal enforcement is questionable. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Agribusiness.
Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1520-6297
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