THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL GLOBAL CARTELS OF THE 1990s: OVERVIEW AND UPDATE
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- Connor, John M., 2002. "THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL GLOBAL CARTELS OF THE 1990s: OVERVIEW AND UPDATE," Staff Papers 28631, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
Cartel. antitrust; market structure; collusion; overcharge; deterrence; U.S. Department of Justice; EU; European Commission; lysine; citric acid; vitamin;All these keywords.
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