Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Post-Cartel Pricing During Litigation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Joseph E. Harrington

Abstract

Standard methods in the U.S. for calculating antitrust damages in price-fixing cases are shown to create a strategic incentive for firms to price above the non-collusive price after the cartel has been dissolved. This results in an overestimate of the but for price and an underestimate of the level of damages. The extent of this upward bias in the but for price is greater, the longer the cartel was in place and the more concentrated the industry. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=joie&volume=52&issue=4&year=2004&part=null
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 52 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 517-533

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:52:y:2004:i:4:p:517-533

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0022-1821

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. John M. Connor, 1998. "What Can We Learn From The Adm Global Price Conspiracies?," Working Papers 98-14, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
  2. John M. Connor, 2000. "Archer Daniels Midland:Price Fixer To The World," Working Papers 00-11, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
  3. Lawrence J. White, 1999. "Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?," Working Papers 99-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  4. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December.
  5. Bryant, Peter G & Eckard, E Woodrow, Jr, 1991. "Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(3), pages 531-36, August.
  6. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1999. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 263-288, Summer.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Chen, Joe, 2006. "Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1185-1212, November.
  2. Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, 2007. "Antitrust," NBER Working Papers 12867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. António Brandão & Luís Guimarães & Carlos Seixas, 2011. "The Relationship between Trigger Price and Punishment Period in Green and Porter (1984) Game made Endogenous," FEP Working Papers 432, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  4. Hans W. Friederiszick & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2010. "Quantification of harm in damages actions for antitrust infringements: Insights from German cartel cases," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-10-001, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
  5. Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2009. "Ökonomische Aspekte der privaten Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts," ZEW Discussion Papers 09-075, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  6. Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2005. "The Impact of Collusion on Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19164, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  7. Kalyn Coatney & Jesse Tack, 2014. "The Impacts of an Antitrust Investigation: A Case Study in Agriculture," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 44(4), pages 423-441, June.
  8. Rüggeberg, J. & Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J., 2005. "Illinois Walls: How barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-10, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  9. Mats Bergman, 2008. "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? or Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Competition Enforcement," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 387-409, December.
  10. Erutku, Can, 2012. "Testing post-cartel pricing during litigation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 339-342.
  11. de Roos, Nicolas, 2006. "Examining models of collusion: The market for lysine," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1083-1107, November.
  12. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  13. Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Explicit vs. tacit collusion: The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments," DICE Discussion Papers 65, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  14. Asker, John, 2010. "Leniency and post-cartel market conduct: Preliminary evidence from parcel tanker shipping," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 407-414, July.
  15. Hüschelrath, Kai & Veith, Tobias, 2011. "The impact of cartelization on pricing dynamics: Evidence from the German cement industry," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-067, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  16. Roman Inderst & Frank Maier-Rigaud & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2013. "Quantifizierung von Schäden durch Wettbewerbsverstöße," Working Papers 2013-ECO-08, IESEG School of Management.
  17. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  18. Gregory Werden, 2008. "Assessing the Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 433-451, December.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:52:y:2004:i:4:p:517-533. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.