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Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus

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  • Catherine Roux
  • Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg

Abstract

We examine the effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, influencing firms’ whistle blowing incentives in one market, on their self-reporting decision in another market. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are proactive US strategies which aim at triggering multiple confessions by increasing the incentives of already convicted firms to report in another market where they collude. Predictably, conditional on conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms’ incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms’ incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC policy. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may induce immediate reporting of both cartels whereas only one of them would have been reported under the EC Leniency Program.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2007/wp-cesifo-2007-05/cesifo1_wp1995.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1995.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1995

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Keywords: Amnesty Plus; self-reporting; antitrust; multimarket contact;

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References

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  1. Motchenkova, E. & Laan, R., 2005. "Strictness of Leniency Programs and Cartels of Asymmetric Firms," Discussion Paper 2005-74, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs," Economics Working Paper Archive 527, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  3. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  4. John M. Connor, 2000. "Archer Daniels Midland:Price Fixer To The World," Working Papers 00-11, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
  5. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003. "Leniency programs and cartel prosecution," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
  6. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1987. "Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games under a Finite Horizon," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-14, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2009. "International Antitrust Enforcement and Multi-Market Contact," CESifo Working Paper Series 2599, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. LEFOUILI, Yassine & ROUX, Catherine, 2010. "Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation," CORE Discussion Papers 2010021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. J. Atsu Amegashie & Bazoumana Ouattara & Eric Strobl, 2007. "Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid," Working Papers 0702, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  4. Sánchez Navarro, Dennis, 2013. "Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multi-mercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos
    [Efficacy and asymmetries of the leniency
    ," MPRA Paper 48699, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2009. "Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement," CESifo Working Paper Series 2632, CESifo Group Munich.

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