Determination of Optimal Penalities for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting
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- Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2008. "Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 189(1), pages 269-291, August.
- Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Determination of Optimal Penalties for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting," Discussion Paper 2004-96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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- Shitao Gong & Xin Gao & Zhou Li & Linyan Chen, 2021. "Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(7), pages 1-29, March.
- Beata Grzyl & Magdalena Apollo & Adam Kristowski, 2019. "Application of Game Theory to Conflict Management in a Construction Contract," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(7), pages 1-12, April.
- Martin Schmidt, 2014. "Fines for Administrative Offences in Public Procurement: An Econometric Model [Pokuty za správní delikty ve veřejných zakázkách: ekonometrický model]," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2014(6), pages 35-50.
- Plaček Michal & Ochrana František & Schmidt Martin & Půček Milan, 2016. "The Evaluation of the Role of the Office for Protection of Competition of the Czech Republic in Regulating Public Procurement," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 9(1), pages 97-116, June.
- Maria Caterina Bramati & Arsen Palestini & Mauro Rota, 2016. "Effects of Law-Enforcement Efficiency and Duration of Trials in an Oligopolistic Competition Among Fair and Unfair Firms," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 170(2), pages 650-669, August.
- Evgenia Motchenkova & Rob Laan, 2011. "Strictness of leniency programs and asymmetric punishment effect," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(4), pages 401-431, December.
- Merino Troncoso, Carlos, 2019. "Optimal dynamic antitrust fines," MPRA Paper 96781, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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