This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2000-05-16 (All new papers)
• NEP-LAW-2000-05-16 (Law & Economics)

1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1984. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 89-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1982. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment," NBER Working Papers 0932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 133-48, April.
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1993. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," NBER Working Papers 3429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1991. "A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals," NBER Working Papers 3232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1991. "A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies among Individuals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 618-21, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Lewin, Jeff L. & Trumbull, William N., 1990. "The social value of crime?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 271-284, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 584-92, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Kaplow, Louis, 1992. "The optimal probability and magnitude of fines for acts that definitely are undesirable," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 3-11, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Louis Kaplow, 1992. "The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely are Undesirable," NBER Working Papers 3008, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-87, April.

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1. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?," MPRA Paper 14369, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ?," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-11, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
   • Eric LANGLAIS, 2009. "Deterrence Of A Criminal Team: How To Rely On Its Members' Short Comings ?," Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, vol. 4(1(7)_ Spr). [Downloadable!]
3. Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Effects of leniency programs on cartel stability," Discussion Paper 98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Effects of leniency programs on cartel stability," Discussion Paper 020, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
4. Eric Langlais, 2007. "Detection avoidance and deterrence: some paradoxical arithmetics," Working Papers of BETA 2007-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Langlais, Eric, 2006. "Detection avoidance and deterrence: some paradoxical arithmetics," MPRA Paper 1148, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Dec 2006. [Downloadable!]
   • Eric Langlais, 2008. "Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetic," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(3), pages 371-382, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Roman Horvath & Eva Kolomaznikova, 2002. "Individual Decision-Making to Commit a Crime: Early Models," Law and Economics 0210001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
6. Eric Langlais, 2008. "On the Ambiguous Effects of Repression," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-40, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
7. Langlais, Eric, 2009. "les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?
   [Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?]," MPRA Paper 14892, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
8. Leliefeld, D. & Motchenkova, E., 2007. "To Protect in Order to Serve: Adverse Effects of Leniency Programs in View of Industry Asymmetry," Discussion Paper 2007-007, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Leliefeld, Daniel & Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2007. "To protect in order to serve, adverse effects of leniency programs in view of industry asymmetry," Serie Research Memoranda 0002, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics. [Downloadable!]
9. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A Note on the Complementarity of Uniform Emission Standards and Monitoring Strategies," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/06, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History). [Downloadable!]
10. Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Too much or not enough crimes? On the ambiguous effects of repression," MPRA Paper 1575, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
11. Motchenkova, Evgenia & Laan, Rob van der, 2005. "Strictness of leniency programs and cartels of asymmetric firms," Discussion Paper 74, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
12. Motchenkova, E. & Kort, P.M., 2004. "Analysis of the properties of current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust law," Discussion Paper 97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
13. Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe, 2009. "Investigating Discretionary Environmental Enforcement: a pilot experiment," MPRA Paper 12735, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]