Investigating Discretionary Environmental Enforcement: a pilot experiment
AbstractIn this work, we conducted a laboratory experiment in order to test the findings of a theoretical environmental enforcement model played as a strategic game where the firm’s behavior is influenced by the course of actions discretionally undertaken by both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Our experimental findings suggest that the presence of the DOJ can be counterproductive in increasing social welfare, since it implies solely additional enforcement costs, which, in turn, might reduce the probability of conducting inspections by the EPA without affecting the probability of firm’s compliance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 12735.
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
classroom experiments; environmental enforcement; environmental economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
- O13 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2009-01-17 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-01-17 (Experimental Economics)
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