Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings?
AbstractIn this paper, we modelize a criminal organization as an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we analyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and level of monetary penalties). Finally, we study a case with joint liability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine in its series Cahiers du CEREFIGE with number 0902.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision: 2009
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More information through EDIRC
Criminal teams; corporate criminality; state dependent risk aversion; deterrence; monetary penalties versus detection;
Other versions of this item:
- Eric LANGLAIS, 2009. "Deterrence Of A Criminal Team: How To Rely On Its Members' Short Comings ?," Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, vol. 4(1(7)_ Spr).
- Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?," MPRA Paper 14369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’shortcomings ?," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-11, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
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