Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eric Langlais
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    In this paper, we modelize a criminal organization as an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we analyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and level of monetary penalties). Finally, we study a case with joint liability.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://cerefige.univ-lorraine.fr/sites/cerefige.univ-lorraine.fr/files/users/cahier_de_recherche_langlais_02_09.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2009
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine in its series Cahiers du CEREFIGE with number 0902.

    as in new window
    Length: 28 pages
    Date of creation: 2009
    Date of revision: 2009
    Handle: RePEc:fie:wpaper:0902

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Pôle Lorrain de Gestion, 13 rue Michel Ney, 54 000 Nancy
    Phone: 03.83.39.63.91
    Fax: 03.83.39.63.90
    Email:
    Web page: http://repec.cerefige.univ-lorraine.fr
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Criminal teams; corporate criminality; state dependent risk aversion; deterrence; monetary penalties versus detection;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December.
    2. At Christian & Chappe Nathalie, 2008. "Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 35-44, February.
    3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 278-88, April.
    5. Arlen, Jennifer, 1994. "The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 832-67, June.
    6. Garoupa, Nuno, 2001. "Optimal magnitude and probability of fines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1765-1771, October.
    7. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00259459 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling, 1998. "On controlling crime with corrupt officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 163-172, January.
    9. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 203-213, June.
    10. Kraakman, Reiner H, 1986. "Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 53-104, Spring.
    11. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September.
    12. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2005. "Crime timing," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7.
    13. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00259459 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Cyrus Chu, C. Y. & Qian, Yingyi, 1995. "Vicarious liability under a negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 305-322, September.
    15. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2005:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Neilson, William S, 1998. "Optimal Punishment Schemes with State-Dependent Preferences," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(2), pages 266-71, April.
    17. Eric Langlais, 2005. "Willingness to Pay for Risk Reduction and Risk Aversion without the Expected Utility Assumption," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 43-50, 08.
    18. Jones-Lee, Michael W, 1974. "The Value of Changes in the Probability of Death or Injury," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 835-49, July/Aug..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fie:wpaper:0902. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sebastien Liarte).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.