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Agent's liability versus principal's liability when attitudes toward risk differ

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Author Info
Privileggi, Fabio
Marchese, Carla
Cassone, Alberto

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V7M-43G3BG8-3/2/eb4b41e34eeef55312770b24ba2f6bc9
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 21 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 181-195
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2001:i:2:p:181-195

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  1. Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?," MPRA Paper 14369, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Hauret, Laetitia & Langlais, Eric & Sonntag, Carine, 2009. "On the deterrent effect of individual versus collective liability in criminal organizations," MPRA Paper 14762, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Antonio Lorenzo, 2003. "The Role of Interest Groups in the European Union Decision-Making Process," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 251-261, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Joshua Graff Zivin & Richard Just & David Zilberman, 2003. "Risk Aversion, Liability Rules, and Safety," NBER Working Papers 9678, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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