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On the deterrent effect of individual versus collective liability in criminal organizations

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Author Info
Hauret, Laetitia
Langlais, Eric
Sonntag, Carine

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Abstract

Our paper addresses the question of the deterrent effect of a monetary sanction associated to a collective rather than an individual liability, when crimes are realized within a hierarchical gang (defined as a criminal organization where the leader is a sleeping partner, and several agents are active partners in the illegal or criminal activity). We develop a model where the active gang members face contradictory incentives to commit a crime. On the one hand, public authorities try to deter each gang member by imposing sanctions; on the second, the leader of the gang try to keep his members enough active in the gang by threatening them of private sanctions. We show that sanctions based on individual liability are inefficient to deter gang’s members since the leader overreacts on the public sanctions. In contrast, we show that a regime of collective liability, allowing the judge to sanction the sleeping partner even if he hasn’t realized any crime himself, can reach enough deterrence of the members of the gang.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14762.

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Date of creation: 21 Apr 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14762

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Related research
Keywords: Gangs deterrence; individual and collective liability; optimal law enforcement;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K0 - Law and Economics - - General
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Privileggi, Fabio & Marchese, Carla & Cassone, Alberto, 2001. "Agent's liability versus principal's liability when attitudes toward risk differ," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 181-195, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 203-213, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Garoupa, Nuno, 2007. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 461-474, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Glaeser, Edward L & Sacerdote, Bruce & Scheinkman, Jose A, 1996. "Crime and Social Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 507-48, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Abdalla Mansour & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2001. "Gangs and Crime Deterrence," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 138, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Sylvaine PORET, 2005. "Structure verticale dÕun rŽseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique rŽpressive optimale," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2005043, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  9. Patacchini, Eleonora & Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Crime and Conformism," CEPR Discussion Papers 5331, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Sah, Raaj K, 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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