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Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective

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  • Nuno Garoupa

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain)

Abstract

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. Second, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.987
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.

Volume (Year): 21 (2000)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 243-252

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Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:6:p:243-252

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Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976

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  1. Alexander, Cindy R & Arlen, Jennifer & Cohen, Mark A, 1999. "Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 393-422, April.
  2. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1993. "Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 239-257, September.
  4. Agrawal, Anup & Jaffe, Jeffrey F & Karpoff, Jonathan M, 1999. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes following the Revelation of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 309-42, April.
  5. Alexander, C.R. & Cohen, M.A., 1996. "New Evidence on the Origins of Corporate Crime," Papers, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division 96-05, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
  6. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 203-213, June.
  7. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1993. "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 757-802, October.
  8. Alexander, Cindy R. & Cohen, Mark A., 1999. "Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, and crime as an agency cost," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 1-34, March.
  9. Fischel, Daniel R & Sykes, Alan O, 1996. "Corporate Crime," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 319-49, June.
  10. Parker, Jeffrey S & Atkins, Raymond A, 1999. "Did the Corporate Criminal Sentencing Guidelines Matter? Some Preliminary Empirical Observations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 423-53, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 410-433.
  2. Echazu, Luciana & Garoupa, Nuno, 2012. "Why not adopt a loser-pays-all rule in criminal litigation?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 233-241.
  3. Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "Collective Responsibility," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2013-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  4. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2007. "Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 81-106, 01.
  5. Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 147-168, July.
  6. Funk, Patricia, 2004. "On the effective use of stigma as a crime-deterrent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 715-728, August.

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