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Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective

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Author Info
Nuno Garoupa (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain)

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Abstract

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. Second, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.987
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Publisher Info
Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.

Volume (Year): 21 (2000)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 243-252
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Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:6:p:243-252

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Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 203-213, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1993. "Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 239-257, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1993. "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 757-802, October.
  5. Alexander, Cindy R & Arlen, Jennifer & Cohen, Mark A, 1999. "Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 393-422, April.
  6. Alexander, C.R. & Cohen, M.A., 1996. "New Evidence on the Origins of Corporate Crime," Papers 96-05, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
  7. Alexander, Cindy R. & Cohen, Mark A., 1999. "Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, and crime as an agency cost," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 1-34, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Fischel, Daniel R & Sykes, Alan O, 1996. "Corporate Crime," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 319-49, June.
  9. Agrawal, Anup & Jaffe, Jeffrey F & Karpoff, Jonathan M, 1999. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes following the Revelation of Fraud," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 309-42, April.
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  1. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2004. "Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment," Working papers 2004-37, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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