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Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment

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Author Info
Thomas J. Miceli
Kathleen Segerson

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Abstract

Standard models of law enforcement involve the apprehension and punishment of a single suspect, but in many contexts, punishment is imposed on an entire group known to contain the offender. The advantages of group punishment are that the offender is punished with certainty and detection costs are saved. The disadvantage is that innocent individuals are punished. We compare individual and group punishment when social welfare depends on fairness (or retribution) and when it depends on deterrence. We show that group punishment may dominate in the former case if the detection technology is ineffective but never in the latter case. The results broadly reflect the actual use of group punishment in ancient and modern law.

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File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/509274
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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal The Journal of Legal Studies.

Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 81-106
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:36:y:2007:p:81-106

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective," Economics Working Papers 529, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Shavell, Steven, 1985. "Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 587-609, October.
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  4. Harris, John R, 1970. "On the Economics of Law and Order," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 165-74, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Miceli, Thomas J., 1991. "Optimal criminal procedure: Fairness and deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 3-10, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Menell, Peter S, 1991. "The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental Risks," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 93-113, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Varian, H.R., 1989. "Monitoring Agents With Other Agents," Papers 89-18, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  9. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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