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Why do corporations become criminals? Ownership, hidden actions, and crime as an agency cost

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Author Info
Alexander, Cindy R.
Cohen, Mark A.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VFK-3VTSD54-1/2/6b72bc9c2a31a6669eb3b2b4a8662e0a
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Corporate Finance.

Volume (Year): 5 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 1-34
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Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:5:y:1999:i:1:p:1-34

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin

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  1. Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, 2006. "The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Compensation," NBER Working Papers 12645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Philip Strahan, 1998. "Securities class actions, corporate governance and managerial agency problems," Research Paper 9816, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective," Economics Working Papers 529, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Daniel Rubinfeld, 2000. "The Primestar Acquisition of the News Corp./MCI Direct Broadcast Satellite Assets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 193-209, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Philipp Festerling, 2005. "Cartel Prosecution and Leniency Programs: Corporate versus Individual Leniency," Economics Working Papers 2005-20, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.


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