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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.

Volume (Year): 23 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 832-67
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:23:y:1994:i:2:p:832-67

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