AbstractCorporate criminal liability is a relatively new development in American law, although it has been expanding rapidly. We argue that there is no need for corporate criminal liability in a legal system with appropriate civil remedies and that corporate criminal liability in practice produces serious problems of overdeterrence. Copyright 1996 by the University of Chicago.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 25 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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- Nuno Garoupa, 2000.
"Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective,"
Economics Working Papers
529, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 243-252.
- Privileggi, Fabio & Marchese, Carla & Cassone, Alberto, 2001. "Agent's liability versus principal's liability when attitudes toward risk differ," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 181-195, June.
- Mattiacci, Giuseppe Dari & Parisi, Francesco, 2003. "The cost of delegated control: vicarious liability, secondary liability and mandatory insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 453-475, December.
- Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law," NBER Working Papers 9698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laurent Franckx & F.P. de Vries, 2004. "Environmental Liability and Organizational Structure," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0401, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Stevens, Ed & Payne, Brian K., 1999. "Applying deterrence theory in the context of corporate wrongdoing: Limitations on punitive damages," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 195-207, May.
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