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Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?

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  • Langlais, Eric

Abstract

In this paper, we modelize a criminal organization as an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we analyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and level of monetary penalties). Finally, we study a case with joint liability.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14369.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14369

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Keywords: Criminal teams; corporate criminality; state dependent risk aversion; deterrence; monetary penalties versus detection;

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  1. Arlen, Jennifer, 1994. "The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 832-67, June.
  2. Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 278-88, April.
  3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 203-213, June.
  5. Neilson, William S. & Winter, Harold, 1997. "On criminals' risk attitudes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 97-102, August.
  6. Kraakman, Reiner H, 1986. "Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 53-104, Spring.
  7. Garoupa, Nuno, 2001. "Optimal magnitude and probability of fines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1765-1771, October.
  8. Neilson, William S, 1998. "Optimal Punishment Schemes with State-Dependent Preferences," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(2), pages 266-71, April.
  9. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2006. "Microéconomie de la corruption," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00259459, HAL.
  10. Jones-Lee, Michael W, 1974. "The Value of Changes in the Probability of Death or Injury," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 835-49, July/Aug..
  11. Eric Langlais, 2005. "Willingness to Pay for Risk Reduction and Risk Aversion without the Expected Utility Assumption," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 43-50, 08.
  12. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September.
  13. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2005. "Crime timing," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7.
  14. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December.
  15. Cyrus Chu, C. Y. & Qian, Yingyi, 1995. "Vicarious liability under a negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 305-322, September.
  16. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00259459 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. At Christian & Chappe Nathalie, 2008. "Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 35-44, February.
  18. Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling, 1998. "On controlling crime with corrupt officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 163-172, January.
  19. Privileggi, Fabio & Marchese, Carla & Cassone, Alberto, 2001. "Agent's liability versus principal's liability when attitudes toward risk differ," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 181-195, June.
  20. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2005:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Ganuza, Juan Jose & Gomez, Fernando, 2007. "Should we trust the gatekeepers?: Auditors' and lawyers' liability for clients' misconduct," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 96-109, March.
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