On the deterrent effect of individual versus collective liability in criminal organizations
AbstractOur paper addresses the question of the deterrent effect of a monetary sanction associated to a collective rather than an individual liability, when crimes are realized within a hierarchical gang (defined as a criminal organization where the leader is a sleeping partner, and several agents are active partners in the illegal or criminal activity). We develop a model where the active gang members face contradictory incentives to commit a crime. On the one hand, public authorities try to deter each gang member by imposing sanctions; on the second, the leader of the gang try to keep his members enough active in the gang by threatening them of private sanctions. We show that sanctions based on individual liability are inefficient to deter gang’s members since the leader overreacts on the public sanctions. In contrast, we show that a regime of collective liability, allowing the judge to sanction the sleeping partner even if he hasn’t realized any crime himself, can reach enough deterrence of the members of the gang.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine in its series Cahiers du CEREFIGE with number 0903.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision: 2009
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Pôle Lorrain de Gestion, 13 rue Michel Ney, 54 000 Nancy
Web page: http://repec.cerefige.univ-lorraine.fr
More information through EDIRC
Gangs deterrence; individual and collective liability; optimal law enforcement;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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