This paper incorporates tax evasion into the analysis of optimal linear income taxation. Tax evaders can influence the probability of being caught, if audited, through expenditures on concealment. It is proved that tax evasion can make a given tax system more as well as less progressive depending on the 'concealment technology.' The paper derives and interprets simple formulas for characterizing the optimal tax rate and audit probability. It also gives sufficient conditions under which tax evasion lowers the optimal tax rate, while showing that an increase in the optimal tax rate is also possible. Copyright 1994 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Ratbek Dzhumashev & Emin Gahramanov, 2008.
"Can We Tax the Desire for Tax Evasion?,"
Economics Series
2008_19, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
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