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Deterrence Of A Criminal Team: How To Rely On Its Members' Short Comings ?

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Author Info
Eric LANGLAIS

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Abstract

In this paper, we assume that a criminal organization is an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we analyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and level of monetary penalties). Finally, we study a case with joint liability.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova in its journal Journal of Applied Economic Sciences.

Volume (Year): 4 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1(7)_ Spring 2009 ()
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:ush:jaessh:v:4:y:2009:i:1(7)_spring2009:53

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Web page: http://www2.spiruharet.ro/facultati/facultate.php?id=14
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Related research
Keywords: criminal teams; corporate criminality; state dependent risk aversion; deterrence; monetary penalties versus detection.;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Arlen, Jennifer, 1994. "The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 832-67, June.
  2. Garoupa, Nuno, 2001. "Optimal magnitude and probability of fines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1765-1771, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Jones-Lee, Michael W, 1974. "The Value of Changes in the Probability of Death or Injury," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 835-49, July/Aug.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 203-213, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling, 1998. "On controlling crime with corrupt officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 163-172, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2005. "Crime timing," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  7. Nuno Garoupa, 1997. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economics Working Papers 246, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1997. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. repec:bep:dewple:2004-1-1087 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Cyrus Chu, C. Y. & Qian, Yingyi, 1995. "Vicarious liability under a negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 305-322, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Privileggi, Fabio & Marchese, Carla & Cassone, Alberto, 2001. "Agent's liability versus principal's liability when attitudes toward risk differ," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 181-195, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Eric Langlais, 2005. "Willingness to Pay for Risk Reduction and Risk Aversion without the Expected Utility Assumption," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 43-50, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Neilson, William S. & Winter, Harold, 1997. "On criminals' risk attitudes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 97-102, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Neilson, William S, 1998. "Optimal Punishment Schemes with State-Dependent Preferences," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 266-71, April.
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