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Microéconomie de la corruption

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  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

Du point de vue de l'analyse économique, la corruption tire ses spécificités de l'imbrication de deux contrats aux objectifs divergents. La corruption est définie comme un accord illégal, ou pacte de corruption, liant un agent à un corrupteur et destiné à organiser le détournement d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire. Ce pouvoir discrétionnaire est hérité, par l'agent, d'un contrat de délégation conclut avec un principal. A partir de cette définition "contractuelle" des situations de corruption, la revue de la littérature proposée ici articule les développements récents de l'analyse microéconomique de la corruption aux propriétés des relations bilatérales entre les joueurs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00259459.

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Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Revue Française d'Economie, 2006, XX, 4, 118-159
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00259459

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Related research

Keywords: Corruption;

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Cited by:
  1. Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?," MPRA Paper 14369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Eric Langlais, 2009. "Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members’ shortcomings?," Cahiers du CEREFIGE, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine 0902, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2009.
  3. David De La Croix & Clara Delavallade, 2008. "Growth, public investment and corruption with failing institutions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL halshs-00129741, HAL.
  4. Éric Langlais, 2010. "Les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 263-280.
  5. Kodila Tedika, Oasis, 2012. "Consequences De La Corruption : Panorama Empirique
    [Consequences of Corruption : Empirical survey]
    ," MPRA Paper 41482, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Kodila Tedika, Oasis, 2012. "Empirical Survey on the Causes of the Corruption
    [Aperçu empirique sur les causes de la corruption]
    ," MPRA Paper 41484, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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