Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Nuno Garoupa, 2004.
"Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 192-206, April.
- Jellal, Mohamed & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004. "Dynamic law enforcement with learning," MPRA Paper 38480, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim & Wenzel, Tobias, 2021.
"Imperfect information about consumer rights: Implications for efficiency and distribution,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
21-098, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim & Wenzel, Tobias, 2022. "Imperfect Information About Consumer Rights: Implications for Efficiency and Distribution," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264049, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Lars Hansen & Signe Krarup & Clifford Russell, 2006. "Enforcement and Information Strategies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 45-61, July.
- Friehe, Tim & Miceli, Thomas J., 2015.
"Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 105-112.
- Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location," Working papers 2014-15, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location," Working papers 2014-31, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Buechel, Berno & Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2020.
"Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naïve offenders,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 836-857.
- Berno Buechel & Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2018. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Sophisticated and Naive Offenders," CESifo Working Paper Series 7106, CESifo.
- D’Antoni, Massimo & Galbiati, Roberto, 2007. "A signaling theory of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-218.
- João Ricardo Faria & Gonçalo Monteiro, "undated". "The Tenure Game: Building Up Academic Habits," Discussion Papers 05/32, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Laure Batz, 2020. "Financial impact of regulatory sanctions on listed companies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 301-337, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
Fine; probability of detection and punishment; learning;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-LAW-2000-03-06 (Law and Economics)
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