Adverse Effects Of Corporate Leniency Programs In View Of Industry Asymmetry
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- Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability," Other publications TiSEM d6321c1e-b79a-4aae-8ef5-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability," Discussion Paper 2004-020, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Natalia Pavlova & Andrey Shastitko, 2014.
"Effects Of Hostility Tradition In Antitrust: Leniency Programs And Cooperation Agreements,"
HSE Working papers
WP BRP 58/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Pavlova, Natalia & Shastitko, Andrey, 2014. "Effects of Hostility Tradition in Antitrust: Leniency Programs and Cooperation Agreements," EconStor Preprints 122051, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Pavlova, Natalia & Shastitko, Andrey, 2016. "Leniency programs and socially beneficial cooperation: Effects of type I errors," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 375-401.
- Catarina Marvão & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018.
"Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt,"
Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 4, pages 57-90,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Marvao, Catarina & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2016. "Cartels and Leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt," SITE Working Paper Series 39, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, revised 16 Nov 2016.
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More about this item
Keywords
antitrust policy; antitrust law; self-reporting; leniency programs;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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