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Archer Daniels Midland:Price Fixer To The World

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Author Info

  • John M. Connor

    ()
    (Department of Agricultural Economics, College of Agriculture, Purdue University)

Abstract

Both market structure and corporate practices of Archer Daniels Midland fostered the implementation of the largest price-fixing conspiracies seen in modern times. The overcharges imposed on U.S. buyers of lysine and citric acid during 1994-1995 by ADM and its co-conspirators amounted to at least $250 million, and the total amount of public penalties, private damages, and legal costs exceeds $666 million. Perpetrators of price-fixing now face monetary exposures that are five times the amount of the harm caused to buyers. These events have spurred renewed attention by U.S. antitrust authorities in prosecuting international cartels.

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File URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/28664/1/sp00-11.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics in its series Working Papers with number 00-11.

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Length: 367 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pae:wpaper:00-11

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Web page: http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/
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Related research

Keywords: Price fixing; lysine; citric acid; sweeteners; wet-corn milling; starch industry; Archer Daniels Midland; market structure; monopoly overcharge; antitrust law; legal damages; U.S. Department of Justice.;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2008. "The impact of collusion on price behavior: Empirical results from two recent cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1290-1307, November.
  2. John Connor, 2001. "Preface – Forensic Economics in Action: The Lysine Cartel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 1-4, February.
  3. Lawrence White, 2001. "Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 23-31, February.
  4. Catherine Roux & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2007. "Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus," CESifo Working Paper Series 1995, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. John M. Connor, 1998. "The global citric acid conspiracy: Legal-economic lessons," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(6), pages 435-452.
  6. Hoekman, Bernard & Martin, Will, 2012. "Reducing distortions in international commodity markets : an agenda for multilateral cooperation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5928, The World Bank.
  7. de Roos, Nicolas, 2006. "Examining models of collusion: The market for lysine," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1083-1107, November.
  8. C. Taylor, 2001. "Indirect Damages from Price Fixing: The Alabama Lysine Case," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 33-43, February.
  9. John Connor, 2001. "“Our Customers Are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 5-21, February.
  10. John M. Connor, 2002. "THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL GLOBAL CARTELS OF THE 1990s: OVERVIEW AND UPDATE," Working Papers 02-04, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
  11. de Roos, Nicolas, 2004. "A model of collusion timing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 351-387, March.
  12. Sylwester Bejger & Joanna Bruzda, 2011. "Detection of Collusion Equilibrium in an Industry with Application of Wavelet Analysis," Dynamic Econometric Models, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 11, pages 155-170.
  13. Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2011. "The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-35, CIRANO.
  14. Joseph E. Harrington, 2004. "Post-Cartel Pricing During Litigation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 517-533, December.

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