Archer Daniels Midland:Price Fixer To The World
AbstractBoth market structure and corporate practices of Archer Daniels Midland fostered the implementation of the largest price-fixing conspiracies seen in modern times. The overcharges imposed on U.S. buyers of lysine and citric acid during 1994-1995 by ADM and its co-conspirators amounted to at least $250 million, and the total amount of public penalties, private damages, and legal costs exceeds $666 million. Perpetrators of price-fixing now face monetary exposures that are five times the amount of the harm caused to buyers. These events have spurred renewed attention by U.S. antitrust authorities in prosecuting international cartels.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics in its series Working Papers with number 00-11.
Length: 367 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Price fixing; lysine; citric acid; sweeteners; wet-corn milling; starch industry; Archer Daniels Midland; market structure; monopoly overcharge; antitrust law; legal damages; U.S. Department of Justice.;
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