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Treble Damage Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing

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  • Salant, Stephen W

Abstract

The traditional model for assessing the effects of treble damage pena lties on price fixing is reexamined and shown to yield surprising res ults. Unless the probability of detection is extremely sensitive to the price charged, increasing the damage multiple will affect neither market efficiency nor expected distribution, and will raise the mark et price. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 95 (1987)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 1326-36

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:95:y:1987:i:6:p:1326-36

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Cited by:
  1. Bourjade, Sylvain & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul, 2009. "Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-Trial Bargaining," TSE Working Papers 09-041, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Gianmaria Martini & Cinzia Rovesti, 2004. "Antitrust policy and price collusion. Public agencies vs delegation," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(2), pages 127-151.
  3. McAfee, R. Preston & Mialon, Hugo M. & Mialon, Sue H., 2008. "Private v. public antitrust enforcement: A strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1863-1875, October.
  4. Schinkel, Maarten Pieter & Tuinstra, Jan, 2006. "Imperfect competition law enforcement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1267-1297, November.
  5. Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra & Jakob Rüggeberg, 2008. "Illinois Walls: how barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 683-698.
  6. Michael Katz, 2002. "Recent Antitrust Enforcement Actions by the U.S. Department of Justice: A Selective Survey of Economic Issues," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 373-397, December.
  7. Schwartz, Warren F. & Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2011. "Optimal antitrust enforcement: Competitor suits, entry, and post-entry competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 967-972.
  8. repec:dgr:uvatin:2005049 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Justus Haucap, 2008. "Whinston, M. D.: Lectures on Antitrust Economics (Cairoli Lecture Series)," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 305-311, 04.
  10. Hunold, Matthias, 2013. "The effects of cartel damage compensations," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-081, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  11. Gianmaria Martini, 2002. "Antitrust Policy and Collusion through Credible Covenants," Working Papers 0204, University of Bergamo, Department of Economics.
  12. Joseph E Harrington, 2001. "Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive 460, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jul 2002.
  13. Gianmaria Martini, 2005. "Hard Core Cartels and Avoidance of Investigation in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Working Papers 0505, Department of Economics and Technology Management, University of Bergamo.

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