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Illinois Walls

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Author Info
Schinkel, M.P.
Tuinstra, J. (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Rueggeberg, J. () (Universiteit van Maastricht)

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Abstract

In its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted the right to sue for private damages suffered from violations of section 4 of the Clayton Act to direct purchasers. Despite the fact that typically antitrust injury is, at least in part, passed on to firms lower in the production chain and ultimately to consumers, Illinois Brick has since stood as a binding legal constraint. This paper considers the strategic use that upstream firms can make of Illinoi Brick to shield themselves from private damages claims. In a repeated game setting, we find that Illinois Brick may facilitate upstream firms in engaging horizontally in an overt collusive arrangement, with concealed side-payments to their direct purchasers that discourage them from filing suit. An example is given of such an `Illinois Wall', in which downstream firms are given part of the upstream cartel profits through a symmetric rationing of their inputs at low prices. The Illinois Wall is found to be resilient to entry, imperfections of the legal system and leniency programs. In fact, the wall is particularly stable when competition is relatively strong at both the up- and the downstream level.

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Paper provided by Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance in its series CeNDEF Working Papers with number 04-03.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:04-03

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Postal: Dept. of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, NL - 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Baker, Jonathan B, 1988. "Private Information and the Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Damage Remedies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 385-408, Fall.
  2. Snyder, Edward A, 1985. "Efficient Assignment of Rights to Sue for Antitrust Damages," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 469-82, May.
  3. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1990. "Are Treble Damages Neutral? Sequential Equilibrium and Private Antitrust Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 870-87, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hugh C. Briggs III & Kathleen D. Huryn & Mark E. McBride, 1996. "Treble Damages and the Incentive to Sue and Settle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 770-786, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Boone, Jan & Müller, Wieland, 2008. "The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases," CEPR Discussion Papers 6949, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Van Dijk, Theon & Verboven, Frank, 2007. "Cartel Damages Claims and the Passing-on Defence," CEPR Discussion Papers 6329, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rüggeberg, J. & Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J., 2005. "Illinois Walls: How barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-10, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
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