AbstractIn its landmark ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted the right to sue for private damages suffered from violations of section 4 of the Clayton Act to direct purchasers. Despite the fact that typically antitrust injury is, at least in part, passed on to firms lower in the production chain and ultimately to consumers, Illinois Brick has since stood as a binding legal constraint. This paper considers the strategic use that upstream firms can make of Illinoi Brick to shield themselves from private damages claims. In a repeated game setting, we find that Illinois Brick may facilitate upstream firms in engaging horizontally in an overt collusive arrangement, with concealed side-payments to their direct purchasers that discourage them from filing suit. An example is given of such an `Illinois Wall', in which downstream firms are given part of the upstream cartel profits through a symmetric rationing of their inputs at low prices. The Illinois Wall is found to be resilient to entry, imperfections of the legal system and leniency programs. In fact, the wall is particularly stable when competition is relatively strong at both the up- and the downstream level.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance in its series CeNDEF Working Papers with number 04-03.
Date of creation: 2004
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Other versions of this item:
- Schinkel,Maarten Pieter & Rüggeberg,Jakob & Tuinstra,Jan, 2003. "Illinois Walls," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra & Jakob Rüggeberg, 2005. "Illinois Walls," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-049/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- RÃ¼ggeberg, J. & Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J., 2005.
"Illinois Walls: How barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion,"
CeNDEF Working Papers
05-10, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
- Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra & Jakob Rüggeberg, 2008. "Illinois Walls: how barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 683-698.
- Boone, Jan & Müller, Wieland, 2012.
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Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 265-276.
- Boone, J. & Müller, W., 2008. "The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases," Discussion Paper 2008-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Boone, Jan & Müller, Wieland, 2008. "The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases," CEPR Discussion Papers 6949, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Boone, J. & Müller, W., 2008. "The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases," Discussion Paper 2008-030, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
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