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Treble Damages and the Incentive to Sue and Settle

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Author Info
Hugh C. Briggs III
Kathleen D. Huryn
Mark E. McBride

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Abstract

We apply Png's (1983) model to antitrust suits to determine the effects of private suits on government suits and vice versa. In equilibrium, a defendant can probabilistically signal a strong case by not offering to settle. A violator's incentive to signal a strong case to deter a treble damage suit forces the government to pursue more trials than it would otherwise. Private plaintiffs are more likely to settle following a government suit than otherwise, but they win a trial with the same probability regardless of whether there was a previous government suit. Data on private suits support the latter two contentions.

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199624%2927%3A4%3C770%3ATDATIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 27 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 770-786
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:27:y:1996:i:winter:p:770-786

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  1. Christopher C. Klein, 2007. "Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability," Working Papers 200713, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rüggeberg, J. & Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J., 2005. "Illinois Walls: How barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-10, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J. & Rueggeberg, J., 2004. "Illinois Walls," CeNDEF Working Papers 04-03, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Schinkel,Maarten Pieter & Rüggeberg,Jakob & Tuinstra,Jan, 2003. "Illinois Walls," Research Memoranda 027, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  4. Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J., 2004. "Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement," CeNDEF Working Papers 04-07, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. R. Preston McAfee & Hugo Mialon & Sue Mialon, 2005. "Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis," Emory Economics 0523, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Bourjade, Sylvain & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul, 2009. "Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-Trial Bargaining," IDEI Working Papers 499, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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