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Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught

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Author Info
Bryant, Peter G
Eckard, E Woodrow, Jr
Abstract

The authors estimate the probability that a price fixing conspiracy will be indicated by federal authorities to be at most between 0.13 and 0.17 in a given year. The authors' estimate is based on conspiracy durations calculated from data reported for a large sample of Department of Justice cases, and a statistical birth and death process model describing the onset and duration of conspiracies. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics & Statistics.

Volume (Year): 73 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 531-36
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:73:y:1991:i:3:p:531-36

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  1. Jeroen Hinloopen, 2005. "The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-104/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jeroen Hinloopen & Adriaan Soetevent, 2006. "Trust and Recidivism; the Partial Success of Corporate Leniency Program in the Laboratory," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-067/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  3. J. Hinloopen, 2003. "Cartel Stability with Time-dependent Detection Probabilities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-104/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  4. John M. Connor, 2002. "THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL GLOBAL CARTELS OF THE 1990s: OVERVIEW AND UPDATE," Working Papers 02-04, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2002. "Post-Cartel Pricing during Litigation," Economics Working Paper Archive 488, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Joseph E Harrington, 2001. "Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive 460, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2002. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive 487, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised May 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. repec:bep:eapcon:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1135-1135 is not listed on IDEAS
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