Pedro Mendi (Universidad de Navarra) Róbert F. Veszteg (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Abstract
We examine the minutes of the executive committees of two Basque firms in the iron and steel industry, Altos Hornos de Bilbao and Vizcaya, to discuss the relevance of dierent factors on the survival and failure of the collusive agreements reached in the industry from 1886 to 1901. We observe intense communication among colluding parties during and after collusive arrangements. Collusion seems to be more likely to break down in periods of falling demand, while strong demand provides these agreements with stability. Additionally, the presence of centralized sales agencies, and similar degrees of vertical integration among colluding firms facilitate collusion.
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Volume (Year): 33 (2009) Issue (Month): 3 (September) Pages: 385-405 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices N84 - Economic History - - Micro-Business History - - - Europe: 1913-
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1995.
"Collusion Over the Business Cycle,"
Discussion Papers
1118, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 2004.
"Through Trial and Error to Collusion,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 205-224, 02.
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