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European competition policy modernization : from notifications to legal exception

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Loss

    (GREG - CRC - Groupe de recherche en économie et en gestion - Centre de recherche en comptabilité - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] - HESAM - HESAM Université - Communauté d'universités et d'établissements Hautes écoles Sorbonne Arts et métiers université)

  • Estelle Malavolti

    (LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)

  • Thibaud Vergé

    (Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle - CREST-INSEE)

  • Fabian Bergès-Sennou

Abstract

Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force in May 2004 and replaced the mandatory notification of agreements by a regime of ex post monitoring. This paper shows that ex post monitoring is the optimal audit regime when the competition authority's probability of error is low. On the other hand, the notification system becomes optimal when the competition authority's probability of error is high. The paper also shows that block exemptions and black list (regimes of per se (il)legality) should be implemented when the agreements' expected welfare impact is very high and very low, respectively.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti & Thibaud Vergé & Fabian Bergès-Sennou, 2008. "European competition policy modernization : from notifications to legal exception," Post-Print hal-01021575, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01021575
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.02.001
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021575
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Growitsch & Nicole Nulsch & Margarethe Rammerstorfer, 2012. "Preventing innovative cooperations: the legal exemptions unintended side effect," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 1-22, February.
    2. Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2020. "Ex ante or Ex post? When the timing of merger assessment is up to the merging firms," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    3. Thibaud Vergé & Estelle Malavolti-Grimal & Frédéric Loss, 2007. "Comment décentraliser la politique européenne de concurrence ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 178(2), pages 115-124.
    4. Andreea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2006. "On the effective design of the efficiency defence," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v06030, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    5. Dzmitry Bartalevich, 2017. "EU competition policy and U.S. antitrust: a comparative analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 91-112, August.
    6. Will, Birgit E. & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2008. "Fighting cartels: some economics of council regulation (EC) 1/2003," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2008-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    7. Fatih Cemil Ozbugday, 2013. "Individual Exemption Applications and Their Assessment: Lessons from the Competition Law Change in the Netherlands during the 1990s," Business and Management Research, Business and Management Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 2(4), pages 148-164, December.
    8. Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2013. "Ex post or ex ante? On the optimal timing of merger control," Working Papers hal-04141196, HAL.
    9. Andreea Cosnita‐Langlais & Jean‐Philippe Tropeano, 2023. "Merger selection, evidence provision, and the timing of merger control," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(1), pages 209-222, January.
    10. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2012. "Do remedies affect the efficiency defense? An optimal merger-control analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 58-66.
    11. Ottaviani, Marco & Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2011. "Ex ante or ex post competition policy? A progress report," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 356-359, May.
    12. Moritz Birgit & Becker Martin & Schmidtchen Dieter, 2018. "Measuring the Deterrent Effect of European Cartel Law Enforcement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-27, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition policy; imperfect audit;

    JEL classification:

    • C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
    • C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation

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