European competition policy modernization: From notifications to legal exception
AbstractCouncil Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force on the 1st of May 2004 replacing themandatory notification of agreements between firms by a regime of ex post monitoring.This paper provides a theoretical justification for this shift based on the competitionauthorityâs accuracy of judgement. We show that ex post monitoring dominates whenthe competition authorityâs probability of error if low enough. We also investigate thetwo other existing legal systems, i.e. block exemptions and black list, and show that theyshould be preferred when the competition authorityâs beliefs about the welfare impact ofthe agreements are very optimistic or very pessimistic.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 52 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
- Frederic Loss & Estelle Malavolti-Grimal & Thibaud VergÃ© & Fabian Berges, 2008. "European competition policy modernization: from notification to legal exception," Working Papers 22644, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
- Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti-Grimal & Thibaud Vergé & Fabian Bergès-Sennou, 2005. "European Competition Policy Modernization : From Notifications to Legal Exception," Working Papers 2005-38, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
- C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
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