On the Effective Design of the Efficiency Defence
AbstractThe efficiency defence was long delayed in the European merger control due to costly implementation issues. In this paper we argue that the upstream consequences of the efficiency defence should equally be considered, namely the improvement of the distribution of notified mergers through the incentives it provides towards more efficient mergers. First of all, we show that even if the Competition Authority may not tell apart the mergers that rightfully invoke the efficiency defence from those that do not, allowing such a procedure can lead to a lower post-merger price. Secondly, we study the impact of merger remedies on the incentives conveyed by the efficiency defence, and conclude on the optimal design of the efficiency defence procedure.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00113503.
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00113503
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
Merger control; efficiency defence; merger remedies.;
Other versions of this item:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1993. "Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, April.
- Ecer, Sencer, 2005. "A rational expectations critique of merger policy analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 73-77, January.
- Jorde, Thomas M & Teece, David J, 1990. "Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 75-96, Summer.
- Loss, Frederic & Malavolti-Grimal, Estelle & Verge, Thibaud & Berges-Sennou, Fabian, 2008.
"European competition policy modernization: From notifications to legal exception,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 77-98, January.
- Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti-Grimal & Thibaud Vergé & Fabian Bergès-Sennou, 2005. "European Competition Policy Modernization : From Notifications to Legal Exception," Working Papers 2005-38, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Duchêne, Anne, 2011.
"Patent office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 242-252, March.
- Bernard Caillaud & Anne Duchene, 2009. "Patent Office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575019, HAL.
- Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003.
"On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lagerlof, Johan N.M. & Heidhues, Paul, 2005. "On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 803-827, December.
- Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2004. "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/24, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Oct 2004.
- Johan Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2002. "On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-08, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, December.
- Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn, 2003. "European Merger Control: Do We Need an Efficiency Defence?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 57-85, March.
- Seldeslachts, Jo & Clougherty, Joseph A. & Barros, Pedro Pita, 2007.
"Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
218, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Barros, Pedro Pita & Clougherty, Joseph A & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2007. "Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," CEPR Discussion Papers 6437, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jo Seldeslachts & Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, 2007. "Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," CIG Working Papers SP II 2007-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Looking behind the curtain--effects from modernization of European Union competition policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 613-624, August.
- Lars-Hendrik Röller & Johan Stennek & Frank Verboven, 2000.
"Efficiency Gains from Mergers,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 00-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Shapiro, Carl & Willig, Robert D, 1990. "On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 113-30, Summer.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.