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European Competition Policy Modernization : From Notifications to Legal Exception

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  • Frédéric Loss

    (Crest)

  • Estelle Malavolti-Grimal

    (Crest)

  • Thibaud Vergé

    (Crest)

  • Fabian Bergès-Sennou

    (Crest)

Abstract

Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force on the 1st of May 2004 replacing themandatory notification of agreements between firms by a regime of ex post monitoring.This paper provides a theoretical justification for this shift based on the competitionauthority’s accuracy of judgement. We show that ex post monitoring dominates whenthe competition authority’s probability of error if low enough. We also investigate thetwo other existing legal systems, i.e. block exemptions and black list, and show that theyshould be preferred when the competition authority’s beliefs about the welfare impact ofthe agreements are very optimistic or very pessimistic.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2005-38.

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Length: 43
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2005-38

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References

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  1. Winand Emons, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft dp0211, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  2. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Looking behind the curtain--effects from modernization of European Union competition policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 613-624, August.
  3. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2000. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," CEPR Discussion Papers 2349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Emons, Winand, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 4131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Petros C. MAVROIDIS & Damien J. NEVEN, 2000. "The Modernisation of EU Competition Policy : Making the Network Operate," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP 00.17, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  6. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1993. "Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, April.
  7. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1989. "Antitrust Enforcement under Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(396), pages 408-25, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2013. "Ex post or ex ante? On the optimal timing of merger control," EconomiX Working Papers 2013-22, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  2. Will, Birgit E. & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2008. "Fighting cartels: some economics of council regulation (EC) 1/2003," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2008-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  3. Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti-Grimal & Thibaud Vergé, 2007. "Comment décentraliser la politique européenne de concurrence ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 178(2), pages 115-124.
  4. Christian Growitsch & Nicole Nulsch & Margarethe Rammerstorfer, 2012. "Preventing innovative cooperations: the legal exemptions unintended side effect," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 1-22, February.
  5. Ottaviani, Marco & Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2011. "Ex ante or ex post competition policy? A progress report," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 356-359, May.
  6. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00113503 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Andreea Cosnita & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2006. "On the effective design of the efficiency defence," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) v06030, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

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