Ex post or ex ante? On the optimal timing of merger control
AbstractWe study the optimal timing of merger control by comparing the pre-and post closing enforcement. Mergers have both pro- and anticompetitive effects, and the parties(the agency and the merging firms) veri able information on them is endogenous: it depends on the timing of the merger control, as well as on some investment in evidence production. The ex post enforcement turns out optimal whenever the costs of providing veri able information on both efficiency gains and market power are sufficiently low, regardless of whether the fi rms know ex ante or not their true merger type.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX in its series EconomiX Working Papers with number 2013-22.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
merger control; competition policy; evidence production;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-07-15 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-07-15 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IND-2013-07-15 (Industrial Organization)
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