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How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?

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  • Pedro Barros
  • Joseph Clougherty
  • Jo Seldeslachts

Abstract

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal International Journal of the Economics of Business.

Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-8

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Handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:17:y:2010:i:1:p:1-8

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Related research

Keywords: Antitrust; Deterrence; Merger Policy;

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References

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  1. Sah, R.K., 1990. "Social Osmosis And Patterns Of Crime: A Dynamic Economic Analysis," Papers 609, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  2. Jo Seldeslachts & Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, 2009. "Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 607-634, 08.
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  4. Seldeslachts, Jo & Clougherty, Joseph A. & Barros, Pedro Pita, 2007. "Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 218, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  5. Eckbo, B Espen, 1992. " Mergers and the Value of Antitrust Deterrence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 1005-29, July.
  6. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Looking behind the curtain--effects from modernization of European Union competition policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 613-624, August.
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  15. Block, Michael Kent & Nold, Frederick Carl, 1981. "The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(3), pages 429-45, June.
  16. Morgan, Eleanor, 2002. "Steering Mergers Through the EU's Regulatory Rocks:: Remedies Under the EU Merger Control Regulation," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 549-561, October.
  17. Eckbo, B Espen & Wier, Peggy, 1985. "Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 119-49, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Lars Sørgard, 2014. "Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-29, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.

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