Bruce Lyons () (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia) Andrei Medvedev () (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)
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This paper provides a first attempt to understand how outcomes are determined by the standard institutions of merger control. In particular, we focus on the internationally standard 2-phase investigation structure and remedy negotiations of the form practiced by the EC. We find that there are inherent biases in remedy outcomes, and identifiable circumstances where offers will be excessive and where they will be deficient. In particular, we find clear circumstances in which firms offer excessive remedies, which goes against a possible intuition that firms should expect to extract an information rent for possessing superior information about competition in the market.
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Paper provided by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in its series Working Papers with number
07-3.
Find related papers by JEL classification: K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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