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Bargaining over Remedies in Merger Regulation

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Author Info
Bruce Lyons () (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)
Andrei Medvedev () (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)

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Abstract

This paper provides a first attempt to understand how outcomes are determined by the standard institutions of merger control. In particular, we focus on the internationally standard 2-phase investigation structure and remedy negotiations of the form practiced by the EC. We find that there are inherent biases in remedy outcomes, and identifiable circumstances where offers will be excessive and where they will be deficient. In particular, we find clear circumstances in which firms offer excessive remedies, which goes against a possible intuition that firms should expect to extract an information rent for possessing superior information about competition in the market.

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File URL: http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP07-3.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in its series Working Papers with number 07-3.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp07-03

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Related research
Keywords: Merger regulation; merger remedies; competition policy; bargaining;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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  1. Bruce Lyons, 2008. "An Economic Assessment of EC Merger Control: 1957–2007," Working Papers 08-17, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak, 2008. "Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing Between Theories of Harm?," Working Papers 08-28, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia. [Downloadable!]
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