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Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies

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Author Info
Paul L. Joskow

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Abstract

This article discusses the application of transaction cost economics (TCE) to the specification of antitrust legal rules and antitrust remedies and explains why the application of TCE analysis may lead to very different legal rules and remedies from approaches that ignore TCE considerations. Antitrust legal rules must be sensitive to the attributes of the institutions we rely upon to enforce antitrust policies, the information and analytical capabilities these institutions possess, the uncertainties they must confront in the diagnosis and mitigation of anticompetitive behavior and market structures, and the associated costs of type I and type II errors implied by alternative legal rules and remedies. Modern imperfect competition theory that fails to take TCE principles into account is likely to lead to poor legal rules and remedies. These conclusions are supported by a discussion of the Kodak case and its progeny and of the proposed divestiture remedies approved by the District Court's decision in the Microsoft case. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.

Volume (Year): 18 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 95-116
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:95-116

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