Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?
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- Lars Sorgard & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2013. "Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?," Post-Print hal-01668416, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Lars Sørgard, 2014. "Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?," Working Papers hal-04141333, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Lars Sorgard, 2018. "Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?," Post-Print hal-01549791, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Lars Sorgard, 2014. "Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?," Post-Print hal-01668440, HAL.
- Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Sørgard, Lars, 2014. "Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 7/2014, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Lars Sorgard, 2014. "Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?," Post-Print hal-01668444, HAL.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2016.
"Enforcement of Merger Control. Theoretical Insights for Its Procedural Design,"
Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 67(HS1), pages 39-51.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2015. "Enforcement of Merger Control : Theoretical insights for its Procedural Design," EconomiX Working Papers 2015-31, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2016. "Enforcement of merger control: theoretical insights for its procedural design," Post-Print hal-01386020, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2015. "Enforcement of Merger Control : Theoretical insights for its Procedural Design," Working Papers hal-04141387, HAL.
- Chopard, Bertrand & Cortade, Thomas & Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea, 2015.
"Success and failure of bargaining in merger control: The case of asset divestitures,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 254-259.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2008. "Settlement in Merger Cases: Remedies and Litigation," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-10, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2015. "Success and failure of bargaining in merger control: The case of asset divestitures," Post-Print hal-01738271, HAL.
- Redkina, Anastasia (Редькина, Анастасия) & Lagodyuk, Ekaterina (Лагодюк, Екатерина), 2016. "The deterrent effect of Russian control of mergers: An Empirical Study [Сдерживающие Эффекты Российского Контроля Слияний: Эмпирическое Исследование]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 79-104, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
merger control; merger remedies; enforcement; deterrence.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2014-06-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2014-06-22 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2014-06-22 (Law and Economics)
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