On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 25 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264
Cartel; Leniency; Cement industry; Games; Chief witness; Bonus regulation; Germany; K2; K21; K42; L1; L4;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994.
"Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
- Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," NBER Working Papers 3822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Looking behind the curtain--effects from modernization of European Union competition policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 613-624, August.
- Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September.
- Apesteguia, Jose & Dufwenberg, Martin & Selten, Reinhard, 2003.
"Blowing the Whistle,"
Research Papers in Economics
2003:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- José Apesteguía & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2003. "Blowing the Whistle," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de EconomÃa - Universidad PÃºblica de Navarra 0303, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra, revised 2003.
- José Apesteguia & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2003. "Blowing the Whistle," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse9_2003, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
- Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003.
"Leniency programs and cartel prosecution,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
- Motta, M. & Polo, M., 1999. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Economics Working Papers eco99/23, European University Institute.
- Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, . "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Working Papers 150, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2000. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," CEPR Discussion Papers 2349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Innes, Robert, 2000. "Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities of Apprehension," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 287-300, January.
- Innes, Robert, 1999. "Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 379-393, June.
- Ulrich Blum, 2007. "The East German Cement Cartel: Cartel Efficiency and Policy After Economic Transformation," Eastern European Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 45(6), pages 5-28, November.
- Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Toshiji Kawagoe, 2005. "An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs," Discussion papers 05003, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
- Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1988.
"To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question,"
Staff General Research Papers
10817, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Lapan, Harvey E & Sandler, Todd, 1988. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 16-21, May.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2001. "Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 167-204, 04.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust," CEPR Discussion Papers 5794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
- Christian Growitsch & Nicole Nulsch & Margarethe Rammerstorfer, 2008.
"Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect,"
IWH Discussion Papers
6, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
- Christian Growitsch & Nicole Nulsch & Margarethe Rammerstorfer, 2012. "Preventing innovative cooperations: the legal exemptions unintended side effect," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 1-22, February.
- Ulrich Blum, 2009. "Cartel identification in spatial markets," Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 137-159, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.