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Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance

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Reinganum, Jennifer F
Wilde, Louis L

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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 27 (1986)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 739-60
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:27:y:1986:i:3:p:739-60

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  1. Laurent Franckx, . "A reconsideration of marginal deterrence in a multi-layered government," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2001-1-1010, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  2. Roland Kirstein, . "Bayesian Monitoring," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1132, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  3. repec:mop:credwp:01.06.22 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. John Knowles & Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, . ""Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence''," CARESS Working Papres 99-06, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Frey, Bruno S. & Jegen, Reto, 2000. "Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1990. "Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners," Working Papers 744, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2004. "Honesty in a Signaling Model of Tax Evasion," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-022/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ralph C Bayer, 2004. "Finding out who the crooks are - Tax evasion with sequential auditing," Public Economics 0412009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  9. Lipatov, Vilen, 2003. "Evolution of Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 966, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
  10. Wane, Waly, 2000. "Tax evasion, corruption, and the remuneration of heterogeneous inspectors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2394, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  11. Nir Dagan & Yossi Tobol, 2005. "Tax evasion, informants, and optimal auditing policy," Economic theory and game theory 021, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
  12. Marisa Ratto & Thibaud Vergé, 2003. "Optimal Audit Policy and Heterogenous Agents," Public Economics 0301001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Lipatov, Vilen, 2005. "Corporate Tax Evasion: a Case for Specialists," MPRA Paper 1250, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 May 2008. [Downloadable!]
  14. Frank A Cowell, 2003. "Sticks and Carrots," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 68, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  15. Rudiger Ahrend & Carlos Winograd, 2002. "The Political Economy of Imperfect Taxation and Sustainable Privatisation : When do Countries Privatise, and Who Gets the Spoils?," DELTA Working Papers 2002-13, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  16. Tatiana Damjanovic & David Ulph, 2007. "Tax Progressivity, Income Distribution and Tax Non-Compliance," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 0712, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews. [Downloadable!]
  17. Erling Barth & Tone Ognedal, 2005. "Unreported Labour," IZA Discussion Papers 1893, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  18. Ralph C Bayer & Matthias Sutter, 2004. "The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection- concealment contest," Experimental 0412003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Arindam Das-Gupta & Shanto Ghosh & Dilip Mookherjee, 2003. "Tax Administration Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-137, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Ognedal, Tone & Barth, Erling, 2005. "Unreported Labour," Memorandum 28/2005, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Barth, Erling & Cappelen, Alexander W. & Ognedal, Tone, 2006. "Fair Tax Evasion," Memorandum 07/2006, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  22. Lipatov, Vilen, 2008. "Social Interaction in Tax Evasion," MPRA Paper 8829, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  23. Lipatov, Vilen, 2006. "Tax Evasion and Coordination," MPRA Paper 1251, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2006. [Downloadable!]
  24. Hans K. Hvide & Todd Kaplan, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Microeconomics 0311001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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