IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecoprv/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_143_2_6095.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Honnêteté et conformité environnementale

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe Bontems
  • Gilles Rotillon

Abstract

[eng] Integrity and Environmental Compliance by Philippe Bontems and Gilles Rotillon . We here study how the existence of conscientious attitudes affects the working of compliance between an environmental agency and polluting firms, where the supervision policy may or may not include firms' self-reporting of discharges. Two main findings have been made. Firstly, non-interference may be the best policy for the agency if there is a high enough proportion of conscientious firms. Secondly, contrary to what we might expect, an exogenous increase in the number of conscientious firms does not necessarily lead to a decrease in pollution. We show that it is in fact possible that, given the number of conscientious firms, the optimum probability of inspection is low enough to entail a growth in fraud and therefore pollution. Moreover, with the system of self-reporting, which is the optimum option, an increase in the number of conscientious firms may also in some cases involve an increase in the total cost of inspection and, ultimately, welfare losses. [fre] Nous étudions dans cette note les conséquences de l'existence de comportement d'honnêteté dans un jeu de conformité entre une agence environnementale et des firmes polluantes où la politique de contrôle comprend ou non une auto-déclaration des firmes en ce qui concerne les rejets polluants. . Deux résultats principaux sont obtenus. Premièrement, le laissez-faire peut être une politique optimale pour l'agence quand la proportion de firmes honnêtes est suffisamment grande. Deuxièmement, contrairement à l'intuition, un accroissement exogène du nombre de firmes honnêtes ne conduit pas nécessairement à une diminution de la pollution. Nous montrons en effet qu'il se peut que compte tenu du nombre d'honnêtes la probabilité d'inspection optimale soit suffisamment faible pour impliquer un accroissement de la fraude et donc de la pollution. De plus, avec le mécanisme d'auto-déclaration, qu'il est optimal de mettre en place, l'accroissement du nombre d'honnêtes peut aussi dans certains cas impliquer un accroissement du coût d'inspection total et in fine des pertes de bien-être.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Bontems & Gilles Rotillon, 2000. "Honnêteté et conformité environnementale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 117-127.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_143_2_6095
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2000.6095
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6095
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/ecop.2000.6095
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_143_2_6095
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/ecop.2000.6095?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
    2. Saïd Souam, 1998. "Dissuasion de la collusion et efficacité de deux systèmes d'amendes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(3), pages 755-765.
    3. Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1994. "Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    4. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
    5. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
    6. Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
    7. Jones, Carol Adaire & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1990. "The social cost of uniform regulatory standards in a hierarchical government," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 61-72, July.
    8. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 403-454, Elsevier.
    2. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2014. "Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, April.
    3. Shouqiang Wang & Peng Sun & Francis de Véricourt, 2016. "Inducing Environmental Disclosures: A Dynamic Mechanism Design Approach," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 371-389, April.
    4. Stranlund, John K. & Murphy, James J. & Spraggon, John M., 2011. "An experimental analysis of compliance in dynamic emissions markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 414-429.
    5. Andrew Yim, 2009. "Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(12), pages 2000-2018, December.
    6. Wang, Hua & Wheeler, David, 2005. "Financial incentives and endogenous enforcement in China's pollution levy system," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 174-196, January.
    7. Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2022. "Costly sanctions and the treatment of frequent violators in regulatory settings," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    8. Philippe Bontems & Gilles Rotillon, 2000. "Honesty in Environmental Compliance Games," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 31-41, July.
    9. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    10. Inés Macho Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2005. "Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 9-45, June.
    11. Leandro Arozamena & Martin Besfamille & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2010. "Optimal taxes and penalties when the government cannot commit to its audit policy," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-10, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    12. Dongryul Lee & Kyung Hwan Baik, 2017. "Concealment and verification over environmental regulations: a game-theoretic analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 235-268, June.
    13. Sverre Grepperud, 2005. "Medical Errors: Mandatory Reporting, Voluntary Reporting, or Both?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 99-112, July.
    14. Sverre Grepperud, 2005. "Medical Errors: Getting the Incentives Right," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 307-326, December.
    15. Kjetil Telle, 2012. "Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway," Discussion Papers 680, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    16. Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
    17. Arun Malik, 2014. "The Desirability of forgiveness in regulatory enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-22, August.
    18. Michael W. Toffel, 2008. "Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the Regulator," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 45-71, May.
    19. Harford, Jon D., 2000. "Initial and Continuing Compliance and the Trade-Off between Monitoring and Control Cost," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 151-163, September.
    20. Katrin Millock & David Zilberman, 2006. "Collective penalties and inducement of self-reporting," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00118778, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_143_2_6095. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ecop .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.